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Abstract: In this paper an overview of the state of research
into cognitive robots is given. This is driven by insights
arising from research that has moved from simulation to
physical robots over the course of anumber of sub-projects.
A number of major issues arising from seminal research
in the area are explored. In particular in the context of
advances in the field of robotics and a slowly developing
model of cognition and behaviour that is being mapped
onto robot colonies. The work presented is ongoing but
major themes such as the veracity of data and information,
and their effect on robot control architectures are explored.
A small number of case studies are presented where the
theoretical framework has been used to implement control
of physical robots. The limitations of the current research
and the wider field of behavioral and cognitive robots are
explored.
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1 Introduction
There is continued interest in the development of
cognitive robots [1–5] as theoretical concepts [6] and
as implementations, whether laboratory based [7], or
application focused [8]. Application areas for such
robots, whether as single artifacts or ecologies, can
include environments unapproachable or dangerous
for human beings [9], assistive robots in the home,
particularly as part of a larger ambient digital ecology [10],
and the next generation of industrial robots [11, 12].
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The focus of these studies is wide and research into
robotics can seem fractured with increasing diversity
and subsequent specialisation. Indeed as Al-Razgan et
al. [13], highlighted there has not been a systematic review
of the field in general for some time. However several
issues are common across these many domains: the link
between perception and action; task modelling; layered
control; navigation; adaptation and learning; and social
interaction between robots and other agencies.
This article makes a case for developing cognitive
architectures as internally consistent control architectures
utilizing motivation and other control states based on
the veracity of sensory and communicated information.
Such control architectures will be capable of a variety of
behaviours and tasks in a variety of environments, and
not limited to a bespoke application. The architectures
developed here do this through the utilisation of metrics
across control states that are realised in a probabilistic
Belief-Desire-Intention reasoning model. Earlier research
on cognitive architectures has focused on the control of
a single agent, using either simulations [14] or a single
robot [15, 16] in known and dynamic environments
(typically populated by non-collaborating agents or
robots). Here reasoning and representational issues that
needed to be addressed, in moving from simulation and
single robot work towards colonies of interacting robots
in unknown environments, are outlined and discussed.
2 Background
Here the interest is in robotic control architectures and
techniques that empower the robot with the ability to
generate intelligent behaviour. One such area of study that
aims to do this, is that of cognitive robotics. Researchers
in this area admit that there are a number of considerable
challenges in adopting cognitive rather than hard-coded
dedicated robots [17]. In their overview of cognitive
robotics, Levesque and Lakemeyer [1] build upon an
earlier manifesto [18]. The ultimate aim of their analysis is
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understanding how to develop high level control systems
for robots that work across application domains and
tasks. They address principles and conceptual issues
faced in developing robot systems for uncertain and
dynamic environments, and the relationship between
perception, reasoning and the granularity of knowledge.
Of particular relevance to the research presented here is
the delineation of given knowledge from acquired domain
and task knowledge, the acquisition of new beliefs from
perception and reasoning, and the temporal validity of
held knowledge.
Langley et al. [19] outline research issues and
challenges in the more expansive area of cognitive
architectures. Although not directly targeted at the
robotics domain, the paper discusses issues that are
relevant, for instance: what constitutes a cognitive
architecture; the nature of learning in cognitive
architectures; perception and the cognitive processes
associated with it such as recognition, categorization and
situation assessment; the nature of decision making and
the provision for alternative choices; planning, execution
and action.
These two seminal papers [1, 19] cover a large range
of issues, and not all will be addressed in this paper, or
indeed, as stated, are particularly relevant for embodied
robots in physical environments. Oneway of viewing these
issues is to consider the sensing to perception to reasoning
to action control arc, and the types of control signals and
knowledge relevant to that as the arc is expanded and
deepened. Levesque and Reiter [18] phrase this in terms of
the relationship between the knowledge, the perception,
and the action of the robot.
A naïve approach is to view the sensing to action arc
as a feedforward process where processing internal to the
robot control architecture maps perceptual information
onto intended action (i.e. a sense-think-act cycle). This
can be trivially changed to allow perceptual actions to
be the result of internal action, i.e. think-sense-think-act,
particularly where the robot has a choice in how it uses its
sensors. Less trivial changes involve the use of feedback
from action to modify perception, or other decision
processes, or indeed the type of perceptual and decision
processes that are relevant to the robot’s “understanding”
of the current environment and its role within it. This
ultimately captures the two issues (conceptual problems)
that Levesque and Reiter term as “when should a robot use
perception to find out if something is true as opposed to
reasoning about what it knows was true in the past?”, and
“when should the inner workings of an action be available
to the robot for reasoning and when should the action be
considered primitive or atomic” [18, p. 106].
Addressing the first issue can be particularly
problematic in rapidly changing, busy, cluttered or
complex environments. Depending upon how the
designer constructs the robot control architecture, this
issue may be resolved as new sensory information is
combined with existing knowledge. In non-deterministic
environments, and this covers many multi-robot and
multi-agent environments, the robot designer will need
to address the issue that knowledge about the world that
a robot inhabits is inherently incomplete and, at best,
slightly out-of-date. Indeed, even in relatively simple
environments totally under the control of one robot,
situations may arise where actions cause unexpected
side-effects, for example building a tower or bridge from
blocks that subsequently collapses leading to erroneous
knowledge about the position of those building blocks.
The second issue relates to the nature of action
primitives. In simulation studies, or limited physical
environments, it may be possible to use a framework
analogous to that proposed by Minsky (in the Society
of Mind [20]), where truly fundamental actions (for
example, parameterised use of single motors or specific
actuators, as described in the shared circuits models of
Boza et al. [21]) are used as primitives and a network of
behaviour activity is built upon them. Indeed, a similar
viewpoint is a central to epigenetic (or developmental)
robotics [22, 23]. Previous work has partially addressed
this issue through the delineation of behaviour as reflex,
reactive, deliberative and higher order behaviours [14].
Some concurrent work using simple robots in adaptive
swarm topologies is approaching this issue using
minimalist version of our cognitive architectures and a
small repertoire of Braintenberg-like behaviours. This
approach to distributed cognition will be returned to in
later sections of this paper.
A fundamental issue relates to the knowledge used in
these processes, and the differentiation between control,
task and behavioural knowledge. Control knowledge is
that which is used in processes that select different
modes of action selection, reasoning or indeed initiate
learning processes. Task knowledge can be thought of
those types of knowledge to be found in most planning
systems or Hierarchical Task Networks; although these
may be embedded within the robot control architecture as
reactive or other types of situated behaviour. Behavioural
knowledge describes these latter type of behaviours and
can be represented in a number of ways, for example
finite state machines, procedural rules or as part of more
encompassing representations (as discussed later in the
section on motivational control states). Underpinning
the use of this control, task and behavioural knowledge
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is the data and information gathered from sensors
and communication. Research in other domains, for
example machine learning and decision support [24, 25],
suggests that all sources of data (including sensors and
communications) should be deemed suspect, even in
benign domains and situations. It is contended that belief
models that fail to take this into account lack veracity and
are destined to fail. In unpredictable, nondeterministic
robotic domains with less than perfect sensors, and
particularly where not all agencies can be trusted, for
example [26], this leads to, at best, inefficient behaviour; at
worst, catastrophic failure. Others, for exampleKowalczuk
and Czubenko [9], have also noted this.
3 Frameworks for Cognition and
Noncognition
Central to the issues introduced above, is the idea of what
to do next, and why. Or if a more thorough consideration
is required, the what and the why (of goal management)
canbe extendedusinga framework similar to that outlined
in the ontological work known as H5W [27]. Others have
also tried to capture a broad spread of investigative
perspectives in addressing what is meant by motivation,
for example [28].
The concept of motivation, and allied affective states,
has been discussed broadly in many disciplines. The
requirement for affective states in complete cognitive
theories and architectures was highlighted in earlier
prominent research [29, 30]. For intelligent control
architectures, affect is a useful concept, providing the
means to relate similar and dissimilar process types
across different levels of abstraction in a complex control
architecture. This is particularly apt for cognitive robotic
control systems where the reason for doing something
can vary across tasks and domains, or even for the same
tasks within a changing environment in one domain. The
basis for much work on motivation has been research
into the nature of emotion. This is not addressed in depth
here, other than to note that theories of emotion can be
typified as belonging to one of several types, as noted
in earlier papers [31]. For example physiological [32],
evolutionary [33], expression [34], appraisal [35] or goal
based [36]. Some [35, 36] consider emotions to be a
cognition centered set of phenomena, while others [37]
consider them to be centered on low-level (neuro-
physiological) control processes that affect cognition.
This is partially due to different programmatic objectives
within differing academic disciplines, for example,
neurophysiology, psychology, philosophy and cognitive
science. Given that there is no one accepted theory or
definition of emotion, the research described here has
proceededwith “just sufficient” definitions to enable clear
differentiation between cognition and non-cognition. This
allows for clearly defined (motivational) control states,
based on concepts that draw on theories of affect and
cognition in biological systems. For example, as described
later, a synthetic system need not model or recognise
the emotive state termed “curiosity” but recognise
highly valenced internal states and/or environmental
affordances that give rise to motivational states and
intentions about investigating a situation, and thus
enable the control architecture to make intelligent
decisions about what to do and how to achieve it. To
paraphrase Levesque & Lakemeyer [1], in order to perform
a task, what information or knowledge is required by the
robot at the commencement of the task and what can be
acquired via perceptual, communicative or other means
during the execution of the behaviours that attempt
to complete that task? Given the adage that “the study
of intelligence is akin to understanding an alien in an
unknown environment”, what does a robot need to know
about its environment as given by its designer? It is more
important and certainly more enabling to design a robot
with the means to determine what is in its environment
and what affordances those found entities offer. Along
the way to designing control architectures that transcend
robot controllers that solve a class of problemsor thatwork
in a class of application domains, it is useful to discover
what are the minimal designs for fruitful behaviour and
how those minimal designs can be extended with the
capability to adapt.
Robot architectures designed and implemented
to address these issues tend to be hybrid
deliberative/reactive systems that range from adaptive
parameterization to constructs that affect the operating
mode of the robot. For example the fuzzy cognitivemodels
of Kowalczuk and Czubenko [9], or the motivated robot
architecture extensions to behaviour based models [38].
Without venturing too far into the argumentation over
symbolic and connectionist approaches to cognition [39],
and retreading existing arguments, the application of
control theory [40] has seen a number of interesting
approaches to the design of artificial cognitive control
systems; albeit most of this work is limited to quantitative
models of motivation, for example [11]. Work on modified
shared circuits models [21] and TSK fuzzy models [41] are
analogous to the low level Rolls’ affect models indicated
above [37]. As such these provide efficient models for
the selection of reactive behaviours in industrial and
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manufacturing environments, and indicate the growth of
control theory into cognitive control systems. The reported
research is indicative of the greater fluidity in control
models required for twenty-first century manufacturing;
the insight they bring to the design of artificial mind
systems is limited by the operational frameworks of the
research and seem to lack the philosophical breadth
of more encompassing studies. Vascak and Hirota [42]
indicate that it is possible to use these parameterised
control models in an architecture that utilises richer
representational modes (Fuzzy Cognitive Maps); however
that work is limited to a small set of behaviours using
simulated robots, albeit later extended to a greater set of
behaviours with real robots in [43].
A relatively recent survey of motivational
frameworks [44] presents an architectural framework
for intelligent (cognitive) systems, with a specific focus
on goal management. It highlights a number of problems
with existing systems related to compromises between
the requirements of the task environment and the design
features of intelligent systems developed to fulfil those
requirements. It suggests the use of deliberative planners
to reason about motives, goals and the behaviour and
action sequences that satisfy those goals. It further
suggests the use of goal management to handle the varied
states associated with goals. The research presented
there is in partial agreement with this requirement as
detailed in [31], and fits with the discussion above on
the differentiation between control, task and behavioural
knowledge. The paper presents a number of open
questions for goal-driven intelligent control mechanisms
that are addressed in the concluding section of this paper.
These issues and topics provide a very broad
framework within which general purpose robot
architectures can be discussed. Biologically Inspired
Cognitive Architectures (BICA) [45] address the issues
associated with the greatest sophistication of design
space associated with intelligent life forms. Like GC-5 [46]
before, BICA has set its aim to the challenge of creating
a real-life computational equivalent of the human mind.
In developing intelligent control architectures for systems
that manipulate robots, or reason about actions, or
perform any number of tasks, replicating the type of
errors human agents make, as highlighted by Kahneman
and Tversky [47], is not viewed as beneficial. There is a
wide range of design spaces for cognitive control systems
beyond this ambition embodied in the BICA challenge.
Holland et al. [45] consider that emotion-like processes are
possible with embodiment (i.e. in a cognitive architecture
considered as part of a robot) but difficult or untenable
in virtual systems. This argument is flawed in that it
oversimplifies the research into emotion, and dismisses
the wealth of research that has used, and continues to
use, synthetic test-beds (i.e. simulations) as a precursor
to physical robots, or that the intended domain is too
hazardous or untenable with which to experiment.
Quirin et al. [48] use positive affect, rather than
emotion per se, to drive switching within a multiple level
robot control architecture. The affective model allows the
interruption of low level behaviour modules by a more
inefficient, information rich, planning systemas andwhen
the behaviourmodules begin to fail, and so allow adaptive
plan execution. The focus is onhow tohandle (unforeseen)
exceptions to plans once those plans are acted upon
by the behaviour modules. Although their affect model
differs greatly from that used in CAMAL (Computational
Architectures for Motivation, Affect, and Learning), their
approach to integrating affect into a hybrid deliberative-
reactive control architecture is similar.
A further paper from the BICA field is particularly
relevant to the current work. Sanz et al. [49] address
how emotion can be used to direct control within a
cognitive architecture. As with the current research they
are more interested in the use of emotion (or affect) as
mechanisms to direct control in a sophisticated cognitive
architecture, rather than model human/biological agent
emotion. Emotion is used at a meta-level to configure the
architecture and allow adaptation. Of particular interest
are the issues that remain problematic to solve, many
of which the reported research addresses, including:
representation of affect in the regulatory processes and in
the goal terms that manipulate; and establishing emotion
dynamics without losing performance dependability.
4 Cognitive Architectures for
Motivation, Affect and Learning
CAMAL (Computational Architectures for Motivation,
Affect, and Learning) is an example of a general class
of integrative cognitive architectures; drawing together
a number of threads in Cognitive Science and Artificial
Intelligence, for example perception, action, decision
making, motivation, affect, and learning. CAMAL [14]
has been in development over 15 years. It is essentially a
design that addresses the question of what is a Theory of
Cognition, as described by Newell [50], and tries to answer
some of the issues that comprise Norman’s Cognitive
Science agenda [30]. Based on earlier work [51, 52], it has
been developed to address the limitations of initial and
incremental implementations [15, 16, 53, 54]. While the
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CAMAL project draws on research in human cognition, it
addresses many of the issues raised above and in doing
so aims to produce adaptable machine intelligence, and
not to produce human-like artificial intelligence. The
ongoing project has not been driven by any specific
testbed or application area; it is a computational design
and implementation testbed with which to experiment
with ideas from cognitive science and see how they map
onto computational platforms, including robots of varying
sophistication. Hence the design and implementations in
simulation and robotic platforms have, to date, tried to
remain general rather than focused on specific application
issues.
The CAMAL model is a construct for investigating
artificial minds that draws on formal (BDI) reasoning,
probability models, affective computation, reactive
machines and self-configurable architectures. The latest
designs (schematically shown in Figure 1 and further
developed from earlier versions) have been developed
using both synthetic and real robots. A distributed
blackboard combines motivator management, goal
selection, behaviour determination, sense and action in
a feedback cycle as it adapts given knowledge and task
definitions to the found environment.
Throughout the remainder of this paper CAMAL is
used to refer to the overall architecture, as indicated in
Figure 1. Although initially implemented as a large single
agent architecture from 1998 onwards, the conceptual
framework holds true for, and has been developed for, the
distributed implementations described here. The upper
schematic in Figure 1 shows reflective and deliberative
processes. The reflective processes monitor the colony
control and the motivator and affective processes at
the deliberative layer. Colony control is represented as
the BDI architectures that are in effect for the current
investigation (and can vary, as described in the next
section of this paper). More compact versions of the
architecture are mapped onto individual robots. These
are individual cognitive robots referred to as SCARAB
(Situated Cognitive Architecture for Reasoning About
Behaviour) or cognitive swarms within the overall colony
(SwarmBots). The upper architecture in Figure 1 is a “robot-
less’ CAMAL architecture that reasons over the data and
information provided by the network of robots. The lower
large architecture depicts a SCARAB instantiation. The
lower two (Reactive and Reflexive) layers in the SCARAB
architecture would be the only components running on
one of the SwarmBots with limited on-board processing
(see Figure 3 and associated text).
The currently favoured BDI set, on the abstract agency,
can be modified by the motivator blackboard and result
in an intended colony behaviour (seen in Figure 1 as Is).
This Intention set is transmitted to the colony robots (Ri,
Rj, Rk and Rl in Figure 1) with responses from that robot
set according to how those intentions map onto the BDI
model activated locally in the robot set (as seen for robot
Rk in the lower portion of Figure). This canonly occur if the
robot possess BDI capabilities locally. Not all robots (see
Figure 3 and associated text) are so equipped.
The lower portion of Figure 1 shows reflexive,
reactive and deliberative processes within one robot
(Rk); metacontrol here is limited to adaptation of the
BDI parameters via behaviour Feedback Adaptation.
Reflexive behaviours (for example Rxi) are low level direct
responses to sensor mappings (such as halt if obstacle
detected). Reactive behaviours are suites of these reflexive
behaviours that can be triggered by sensory mappings
(such as Rbi and Rbj), or tightly coupled with BDI
combinations (such as Dx-Rbx and Dy-Rby). Reflexive and
reactive behaviours can combine, be overridden (by BDI
Dx-Rbx couplings) or override BDI couplings according
to the parametrization of the SCARAB architecture
(again norms built at initialisation or modified through
communication from the colony controller). The following
sections provide details using examples from one set of
experiments with SwarmBots and one set of experiments
using more sophisticated robots running the SCARAB
implementations.
The current work is driven by test-beds that comprise
of a set of (over 15) non-homogeneous robots, with
some development work using a simulator [55]. This
has required a conceptual redesign of several parts
of the cognitive architecture for several reasons. The
CAMAL architecture was developed in order to address
a number of research issues relating to cognition, affect
and behaviour. It has become quite complex with many
capabilities not required by the simpler robots, for
example an extensive meta-cognitive capability. It was
developed initially with a view to being implemented
on single agents in mainly simulation work with
limited application to the control of robots in a physical
environment. CAMAL, and its variants was moderately
successful in the control of single robots [15, 16]. Here we
consider its limitations and the path forward to its use
in the control of multiple robots of differing capabilities.
The current work has led to significant changes to the
architecture so not only can it control multiple robots but
provide a general mechanism for the tasks those robots
are expected to perform.
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Figure 1: Robot Network and Control Architecture. The upper schematic represents an abstract agency that sits above any number of
physical agents (i.e. robots) shown as the blue ellipses associated with the Robot Network (Ri, Rj, Rk, Rl); one of the robot ellipses(Rk) is
expanded (as in the lower schematic) and is one of the more sophisticated robot designs (shown to right in Figure 3). The abstract agency
may actually reside on a robot with suflcient processing power and/or simultaneously elsewhere across a communication network (as
indicated in Figure 3).
4.1 Control of reasoning with Beliefs,
Desires and Intentions
Reasoning in CAMAL occurs over multiple layers and
multiple representational constructs. At its simplest
and lowest level, use is made of simple parameterized
actions running just above and controlling the robot
microcontroller. Such actions can include sensing (using
a specified sensor) and movement of the robot or some
component part. These can be combined into behaviours
at the reactive level. The selection of behaviours and/or
actions is via a variety of Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI). The
nature of the BDI reasoning is in turn controlled by higher
level (deliberative) processes, and norms. Reflecting this
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separation are different time models. The deliberative
(BDI) work on a time cycle that reflects the BDI updating
process given below. Within any one BDI cycle, there
exist at most one call to the reactive sub-architecture.
The reactive sub-architecture has its own time model
and may be constrained to a specified limit of (reactive
behaviour) cycles or allow open ended processing. There
are then the time models occurring immediately above
the robot microcontroller plus the microcontroller model.
In many cases the result of a BDI update is a call to the
reactive then robot microcontroller, with a subsequent
surfacing of feedback from the lower layers back to the
initiating BDI processes. However the architecture does
allow amore complex interaction across the layers if lower
layers require higher level processing in order to complete
their actions. In this case, for example the convex hull
mapping described in section 7, a tightly bound ‘reactive
call’-percept-belief update cycle is initialised within the
one BDI cycle.
The principle behind orthodox BDI models, as
originating from Rao and Georgeff [56], is that as a
Belief set is updated through perception, reasoning,
communication or other means; this precipitates a change
in the viability of a Belief, Desire and Intention set,
potentially leading to a change in behaviour. Hence given
a new set of Perceptions (P), a preference operator and a
set of Beliefs (B), the updating of an ordered set of Belief
propositions (r, s, q, p, ¬p) occurs as follows:
• P := { r, s, q, p } ( Perception set)
• B := { ¬p } ( Belief set )
• P⊗ B→ B′ (Belief Revision – Various
models)
 Preference := { p » ¬p, s » r » ¬p, q » ¬p » ¬s » ¬r }
(example model)
• B′ := { p, s, r, q,¬p } (updated Belief set)
• D := { p&s→ gz, r&¬p→ g¬z, s&q→ gx } (Desire set)
• B⊗ D→ D′ (Desire Update)
• D′ := { p&s→ gz, s&q→ gx, r&¬p→ g¬z } (updated
Desire set)
• I := { r&gz→ b1, gz→ b2, p&gx→ b3,. . . , ¬p&g¬z→ b5 }
(Intention set )
• D′ ⊗ I→ I′ (Intention Mapping )
• I′ := { p&gx→ b3, gz→ b2, r&gz→ b1, ¬p&g¬z→ b5 }
Behaviour b3 preferred
The perception set (P) is combined with the existing belief
set (B) and ordered according to the reference operator to
give B′. The new belief set, B′, contains the perceptions
which have been processed in the order that accords with
their significance to that individual. This preference is
then propagated through Desire and Intention updating
resulting in the given order of behaviours.
The BDI model used in this work originates from
the model used in CRIBB (Children’s Reasoning
about Intentions, Beliefs and Behaviour), developed
to investigate reasoning in young children [57]. This
schema was implemented as a computer model to
simulate knowledge and the inference processes of a
child solving problems [58]. Earlier research [53] saw a
variety of CRIBB (a-CRIBB) developed utilizing affect in
a preference operator to prioritise between competing
reasoning statements and processes. The preference
operator, based on a qualitative model of affect, allows
discrimination between beliefs that are derived from
assumptions, perceptions or deductions. Perception
can be further sub-divided to include direct perception
and indirect perception (i.e. from another agent that
has some degree of trust associated with it). Hence
beliefs can be ordered according to the degree of trust
in them. This preference then cascades through goal
and behaviour selection. Subsequent research [16] has
seen the a-CRIBB model extended with a belief structure
allowing quantitative degrees of belief to be ascribed to
belief statements, according to the source of the belief.
This probabilistic model has been further developed in
the research reported here, with the control flow of the
BDI revised in light of structural and representational
changes to the cognitive control system.
CAMAL uses this cognitive BDI schema to drive
a motivational blackboard. Rather than attempt to
completely and accurately model an agent’s world, affect
can be used to guide attention so an agent is drawn to
aspects of the environment deemed to be of importance.
The affect ordered belief set then drives the Desire and
Intention reasoning schema, leading to the selection
of action that reflects the current focus of the agent
as reflected at the Belief level. The latest versions of
CAMAL extend the BDI model further with the now
probabilistic affect model being used to drive the entire
BDI reasoning cycle. Beliefs are given a likelihood of
belief measure (based on affordance and affect models),
Desires (or goals) an importance value and Intentions (or
associations) an insistence value.
The BDI example given earlier may now look like
this (given a specified belief source preference). Given
a set of sensor specific perceptions (Psensor1,Psensor2), a
preference operator and a set of Beliefs (B), the updating
of a set of propositions (r, s, q, p, ¬p) occurs as follows:
• Psensor1 := { s, q } (Perception set from sensor1)
• Psensor2 := { r, p } (Perception set from sensor2)
• B := { ¬p } (Belief set)
• Psensor1 ⊗ Psensor2 ⊗ B→ B′ (Belief Revision – no
logic tautology)
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 Preference := { Psensor1 » Psensor2 » B }
⇒ Preference { s » q » r » p »¬p }
• B′ := { s, q, r, p } beliefs status given Affordance
R[0,1]
• D := { p&s→ gz, r&¬p→ g¬z, s&q→ gx } (Desire set)
• B⊗ D→ D′ (Desire Update)
• D′ := { s&q→ gx, p&s→ gz } (updated Desire set)
• I := { r&gz→ b1, gz→ b2, p&gx→ b3,. . . , ¬p&g¬z→ b5 }
(Intention set)
• D′ ⊗ I→ I′ (Intention Mapping)
• I′ := { gz→ b2, r&gz→ b1, p&gx→ b3 } Behaviour b2
preferred
The nature of belief updating can be modified from
a default model, at run-time, when the architecture
experiences repeated failures in performing tasks (i.e.
performing actions that fail to instantiate some intention
on the world with which the architecture is interacting).
The selection of belief updating models (and other
parameterizations of the architecture) is performed by
meta-management processes (and to a lesser extent be
Feedback Adaptation as shown in Figure 1). The trigger
for calling these processes is part of the motivator
management process. CAMAL (and SCARAB) uses a
motivational blackboard (centre of the upper and lower
schematics in Figure 1). This is an affect grounded BDI
equivalent to Baars’ Global Workspace Architecture [59],
where a number of autonomous modules communicate
via the global workspace, which can be viewed as
motivational control state common to all processes across
the architecture.
4.2 Representation of Control States
CAMAL makes use of a hybrid reactive-deliberative
architecture based on the control state approach
to mind [31, 51] but developed around the a-CRIBB
model described above. A control state is architecture
instantiation or behaviour internal to an agent. In essence,
control states involve a number of representational and
process concepts, such as beliefs, desires, intentions,
motivators, etc.. They can be considered as general
behaviourswithin an agent, and therefore can bemodified
or updated at any time by other processeswithin the agent.
Control states can exhibit external behaviours (such as
obstacle avoidance) or, reflect and control internal
states (such as beliefs, belief revision models etc.). The
motivational construct that is central to the motivational
blackboard is discussed in depth elsewhere [14, 31]. More
recent work on probabilistic reasoning in CAMAL [16], and
subsequent development, has seen the metrics associated
with the BDI and motivational constructs improved in
the research reported here. The following sections detail
how the reasoning over these fundamental control states
is achieved. All examples given are actual output from
one of the robot experiments described later in the paper.
Hence,
• Beliefs are of the form belief(Semantic Content, Source,
Time, Belief Status). Semantic Content is a proposition
(using predicates of arity 0 or more) denoting a
possible state of affairs, and is held to be true
according to its Belief Status – a probabilistic affect
value in the range R[0,1]. Belief status varies across
different perceptual sensors, deduction models and
assumption sources. Time denotes the cognitive BDI
cycle when the belief was first derived. The three
following statements give beliefs of each source type
belief( sensor(sonar,range,4000), assumption, 0, 1.0)
belief( identified( sonarbundle9, amigo-blue, 1, −1120,
2, 2172), perception, 14, 0.9)
belief( inspect( amigo-blue, 1944, −1116, −1, 224),
deduction, 17, 0.9)
The first is an assumption from the task model for the
robot about the range of its sonar (in mm), and defined at
initialisation (i.e. cycle is 0). The second is a statement that
the perceptual processes have identified a cluster of sonar
readings (sonarbundle9) as a specific robot (amigo-blue)
from a specified location (x=1, y=−11120) with a polar
reading( angle = 2 radians, range = 2172 mm). The third
statement arises from deliberation over which sub-task to
attend. Although this relates to the same object referred to
in the perception belief, the relative pose is different as the
perceiving robot hasmoved over the three intervening BDI
cycles.
• Goals are of the form goal( Descriptor,
SuccessCondition, Importance), where Importance is a
real value in the rangeR[0, 1]. Importance ismanaged
by affective processes in motivator evaluation and
goal revision. Descriptor and SuccessCondition both
use propositions defined over the same predicates as
the Semantic Content for Beliefs. For example
goal(approach(corner),near(corner, RobotX, RobotY,
Theta, Range),0.5625).
This defines a goal to approach an area previously
identified as a corner and to return the relative pose
(RobotX, RobotY, Theta, Range) once successfully
completed.
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• Associations are of the form association( Name,
ConditionList, Desire, Intention, Insistence), where
Insistence, is a real value in the range R[0, 1].
Insistence is managed by the BDI affective processes,
and is strengthened by goal completion using the







This defines the Belief-Goal-Intention mapping
corresponding to the example goal given immediately
above. The ConditionList can be an empty list or any
combination of valid propositions fitting the Semantic
Content associatedwith beliefs. Here it defines a condition
that states if the current focus is an object detected by
sonar and identified as a corner, with relative pose
matching the current x and y of the robot pose, and
the goal is to approach that object, then use a reactive
behaviour methodapproach. This behaviour definition
includes three Boolean sensor states informing the
reactive sub-architecture not to use Bump Sensors, to use
Sonar and not to use Camera for the behaviour.
• Motivators are of the form motivator( Goal,
Association, Time, Deterministic, Cycles, Intensity),
where Intensity is a real value in the range R[0, 1].
Time gives the BDI cycle in which the motivator was
generated. The Deterministic element determines the
exit strategy for the behaviour modules that form
the reactive component. If this is set to true then the
behaviour should return as soon as it is successful
or for a maximum of the Cycles element. The Cycles
element gives the number of reactive cycles that the
reactive component (Rbx in Figure 1) should run
for in pursuing the behaviour associated with this
motivator. The example given below uses the goal
and association examples given above, and attempts
to run for 10 cycles and return at that point even if the
behaviour is unsuccessful (Deterministic value set to
false):
motivator(goal(approach(corner), near(corner,
RobotX, RobotY, Theta, Range), 0.5625)
association(association145,
conditions([focus(sonarobject43, corner, 2113, −1454,
−100, 3834),pose(self, 2113, −1454, −50)]),
approach(corner),reactive(false, true, false,
methodapproach), 0.95), 17, false, 10, 0.64667).
The belief values for Belief Status, Goal Importance and
Association Insistence are combined within the Intensity
value for the motivational construct. The nature of this
combination and the parameterisation of the deliberative
aspects of the architecture are controlled through Norms.
4.3 Domain and Task Models
The architecture presented here allows the same robot
to be used for multiple tasks in any one domain and
again in a number of domains. Domains are generic
environments that allow for a range of task types. A
domain canbe a type of internal environment, for example
a human oriented space such as an office, corridor or,
in due course, a more specialized type of environment
such as kitchen, manufacturing or industrial space. Each
type of environment can support multiple task models,
for example mapping an unknown room, determining
location, outline and type of objects, finding and tracking
other robots etc. Any particular task model can be
combined with other task models as a hierarchical BDI
model.
The architecture is loaded with a set of default
predicates covering how it will run. These are then
modified according to the domain model, and the task
model defined in a declaration file that is used to initialize
a specific robot architecture. The declarations file not
only includes a domain-task model but also the robot (or
robot colony processor) definition. The robot definition
is used to ensure at load time that of all possible robot
behaviours, and associations using them, only those that
are compatible with the robot sensor and processing
capabilities are instantiated. This ensures not only can a
robot be used for multiple tasks in a number of domains,
but a particular domain-task model can be used, with
some variation reflecting the robot configuration, across
multiple robots.
The domain-task model defines sets of goal-
association pairings. For simple or tightly focused
tasks this might be just a set of root goal-association
pairings. For more demanding or flexible tasks this will
include not only the root pair but also other hierarchical
goal-association pairs that focus on specific tasks. The
task models, typically a set of three (Prolog) files defining
goals, associations (or intentions) and declarations,
are used to initialize the architecture for a specific
robot-domain-task sub-configuration. The declarations
include the predicate domain_bdi_model(Name, Goals,
Associations) where Name defines a unique domain-
task symbol (for example swarm-root, swarm-track1
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etc.) and Goals and Associations are the names of files
containing the Goal-Association pairings. The goal-
association pairings can include context rules that denote
the conditions in which that pairing is suitable for use
and also specific conditions when control needs to be
passed to an alternative goal-association pairing set.
The architecture includes domain-task independent
context switching rules for reasoning, goal and behaviour
failures. These can be overridden by the domain-task
model rules. Part of the distributed blackboard used in
the architecture is responsible for monitoring the context
switching. Central to this aspect of the blackboard is
the predicate mblackboardcontrol( Mode, Root, Parent,
Current, History), where Mode defines the BDI reasoning
mode (as described in the following section), Root is the
base domain_bdi_model Name, Parent is the previous or
calling ruleset, Current the one being used and History
reflects the sequence of rulesets previously used.
Figure 2: Example (simplified) SCARAB BDI Graph, showing
alternative decision paths from two starting Belief positions
(Double Circles N1 and N2) over four levels of the BDI model. Belief
states shown in circles; Goal-Intention combinations as labelled
arcs between Belief states. Arrows to left and right infer BDI
revision upon earlier Belief states dependent upon Goal-Intention
success or failure.
The goal and association files are paired and include
examples fitting the definitions given above. A goal may
be referenced in any number of associations with differing
belief basis, allowing alternate behaviour paths for goal
completion. As shown in the simplified SCARABBDI graph
in Figure 2, these BDI arcs can be easily represented
as acyclic graphs. The figure shows a subset of the BDI
cycle (four nodes deep) used in the mapping experiment
described in section 7. The two concentric circles are
starting Beliefs (the environment is dynamic and sparse)
given at initialisation. As a result of one possible Goal-
Intention arc, an alternative to Belief N1 (Environment
is sparse) is shown by Belief N3 (Environment is not
sparse); these would be examples of p and ¬p in the
BDI update models given in section 4.1. Goal-Intention
arcs are labelled with the Intention, the terminating node
represents the Goal (i.e. Belief predicates that need to be
made true or false). For example, the alternative goals
from node N8 (Robot found at N5 and Identified as an
AmigoBot at N8). Dependent upon the preferences set for
the BDI model, the strengths of the Beliefs, Goals and
Intentions the robot can choose between three different
goals (represented as nodes N11, N12 and N13) with
associated Goal-Intention arcs (respectively, labelled as
DO-TASK, TRACK and AVOID). The arrows to the left and
right of the sub-graph represent the effect of a BDI update
after goal success or failure.
As the experiment progresses more of the BDI
graph becomes instantiated; however with the
proviso that Beliefs can be erased according to
the BDI norm describing belief decay. For example
norm(belief,belief_decay_threshold,25), where the 25
represents the number of BDI cycles a belief can be held
as true (to the extent of its associated probability). Further
examples of norms governing the BDI model are given in
the following section.
Task models are currently manually built and then
loaded at run-time. The roboCAMAL sub-project reported
in [15] made use of reinforcement learning to modify
task models; current implementations lack this feature,
although it is part of the sub-project described in section 6.
The taskmodel used can vary over the lifetime of a CAMAL
experiment as a result of goal and intention evaluation.
Currently the architecture does not support any structural
learning. The models can be time consuming to build
and flawed in their specification, even with bespoke
logic checking software. Furthermore they do not fully
support multi-robot ecologies. As this research progresses
further into ambient environments supporting multiple
robot ecologies, this needs to be addressed, taking into
consideration the research into ontological task and
domain models, for example [3, 27].
4.4 Controlling BDI and Reasoning
The architecture, BDI and motivational models are
configured at run-time using domain models that
allow the architecture to instantiate itself in a specific
configuration of robot, domain and tasks. For any
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particular configuration of the architecture on a specific
robot, there is a default behaviour, for example obstacle
avoidance. This default behaviour (or possibly a set
of default behaviours) is specified in the domain-task
model and can be set to an alternative (set of behaviours)
by the deliberative architecture – an example of many
interactions taking place between the various layers
of CAMAL. For a specific domain model, there are
several behaviours associated with it; which represent
intentions in the BDI model, prioritized and ranked by the
affordances set by the affect and norm models. The BDI
and control processes interact through the use of affect
and affordances.
Norms are used to control selection and management
of BDI. By default the architecture looks to perform new
actions. A new action here is defined in terms of a
unique belief-desire-intention arc instantiation. However
it has been found that in some situations, for example
a constrained robot environment with a set number of
objects and dynamic agents, that this can be counter –
productive and lead to no viable BDI combination that
is new. The BDI generation and selection mechanisms
catch this (via meta-reasoning) and change the norm for
BDI generation and selection from generative to regressive
mode, allowing previous BDI arcs to be chosen. For
example finding another robot that was found but lost
some time ago. Alternatively, specific behaviour modules
may generate a set of beliefs causing the architecture to
pursue a preferred direction.
The affect system and reasoning processes associate
their actions with the difference between the current
and desired state of the motivator. In all cases, these
metrics can change over time as the robot adjusts to the
world it inhabits and the domain model loaded. These
modifications are the result of a parameterized evaluation
processes and reasoning models. The parameters and
current reasoning modality is defined through the use of
Norms as selected by default or modified by the Meta-
Control or BDI Feedback Adaption processes. Motivator
evaluation modifies the values associated with Goals
and Associations based on the success or failure of the
motivator, and the current Norms controlling the BDI.
The adaption parameter, as explored in the experiments
presented in [15], is a real valued number in the
range [0, 1].
• Norms to ascribe initial metrics to Belief:
– Source – assumption, deduction, perception (variety).
These nominal tokens are associated with an
affordance mapping given in the initialisation
parameters. These can be changed, depending
upon the current BDI set, so that probability values
associated with a belief source can change at run-
time.
• Norms to control Belief Updating
– Belief decay, beliefs can be managed in a number of
ways;
– Belief deletion (transfer to memory) so ¬p and p
cannot co-exist in current belief set (logic tautology
disallowed). The preferred belief selected, by default,
upon recency (newer beliefs) but the BDI model can
be modified to prefer belief importance, or exception
models for specific predicates;
– Belief models associated with specific task models
and BDI rulesets.
• Norms to control BDI are:
– Akin to conflict set resolution in rule based systems,
for example recency, specificity, redundancy etc.
– BDI chosen on a selection mode (currently five)
across the affect values associatedwithbeliefs, desires
and intentions. Variations on this allow for recently
generated, historically generated or recurrent (time-
based) BDI arcs to be preferred.
5 Robotic Platforms and
Architecture Implementation
Previous robot systems such as roboCAMAL [15] used the
generic architecture tailored to a specific robot experiment.
In the current work a more general architecture (as seen
in Figure 1) has been developed from earlier simulation
work that allows alternative task models to be loaded that
configures the architecture for a specific robot or robot
colony and its duties. Figure 3 shows the information
and control flow paths for the major modules for the
implementation of the design in Figure 1 for the suite of
robots shown in Figure 4.
The current research looks towards building a
distributed model of cognition, with the organization
of the robot swarm adapting to the needs of the colony,
the demands of the current task and the nature of the
environment. Not all the robotic platforms used have
the same sensor or onboard processing capabilities
(see image in Figure 4). All robots are fitted with sonar,
although the number and type vary across the different
robot platforms. A Pioneer and five AmigoBots (see
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Figure 3: Architecture Schematic with more sophisticated robots to
the right of figure. Single arrows represent control and information
flow. Walled arrows represent information flow. Dashed lines
represent communication over the network. Solid lines represent
communication within a processor.
Figure 4: Part of the full complement of the robots used in the
developments described here.
Adept MobileRobots [60]) are fitted with cameras so
they are capable of supporting visual perception. One
of the AmigoBots (as discussed in [15]) makes use
of an omni-directional vision system; the others use
directed cameras. A powerful processor (Matrix 5i) is
used for the larger (Pioneer 3-DX) robot, enabling it to
be developed as a mobile vision processing centre (and
shown schematically as the configuration associated
with robot Rk in Figure 3). A further off-robot system is
being developed for coordination (the Colony Controller
to the top of Figure 3). A less powerful and smaller set
of robots form part of the larger colony. Some of these
ActivityBots (see [61]) are equipped with Raspberry Pi
with an associated Pi camera.
All the AmigoBots and a number of ActivityBots have
an onboard Raspberry Pi for local control (and these are
shown schematically as the configuration associated with
robot Rj in figure 3); other ActivityBots have no such
onboard computer and rely on their robot microcontroller
for limited local control under the direction of an external
controller (as indicated by the configuration associated
with robot Ri in figure 3). Communication across the
robot colony enables even the simplest of the robots to
change the focus of their onboard processing and alter
their current behaviour. The full control architecture can
contain sub-colonies (swarms), such as a number of
ActivityBots which can be used for fast exploration of
an environment to establish the presence of objects of
potential interest. Indeed some of the research makes use
of small colonies of AmigoBots or ActivityBots running a
very reduced SCARAB architecture; typically Braitenberg
reactive Behaviours plus sensors and a limited form of the
Belief system introduced above (as described in section 6
below). Hence a wide range of behaviour capabilities and
control systems ensue across the robot colony. The robots
can be situated in any number of indoor environments; the
latest of these hosts an environmental camera systemwith
its own dedicated PC to enable localisation of objects and
robots. All robots, embedded computers, and off-board
computational devices can communicate with each other
over a dedicated wireless network as shown in the central
part of Figure 1 (and in Figure 3).
The control architecture for any robot (with sufficient
on-boardprocessingpower) canbe localised or distributed
(see Figures 1 and 3); comprising of a cognitive control
architecture (implemented in swi-prolog), and a local
behaviour control. The behaviour control architecture
for those robots with a raspberry pi is implemented
in a networked C++ or C module that interacts locally
or remotely with the immediate and remote cognitive
processes.
6 Collaborative Tasks and Shared
Information using swarms
Experiments with part of the architecture depicted in
Figures 1 and 3 involved the use of five ActivityBots [61],
seen in Figure 4, with a limited set of Braitenberg [62]
behaviours to investigate the use of adaptive swarm
topologies. The robots were designed with four
Braitenberg behaviours activated according to their
affective (non-cognitive) state; nominally that of curiosity.
The project is to be described in full elsewhere (Shylaja
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Figure 5: The two Braitenberg Vehicles used as designs for the
behaviours of the ActivityBots showing alternative connection
topologies.
and Davis, submitted for publication); here an overview is
presented to show how aspects of the CAMAL architecture
map onto colonies of less complex robots.
Here, curiosity is defined as a psychological
construct [63, 64] that leads to exploratory behaviour.
Curiosity is a motivated (to be desired) cognitive state that
links learning and explorative behaviours in biological
systems. Curiosity arises when there is lack of coherence
across cognitive processes about the origin of some
perception, thought, belief or desire. It drives animals to
explore and find new knowledge that can bridge the gap of
non-coherence. There are a number of other projects that
have investigated the use of thismotivational state [65, 66];
here the deliberate adoption of a constrained behaviour
set is used to investigate a minimal configuration of the
CAMAL architecture.
Five ActivityBot robots were designed as Braitenberg
vehicles, each with two forward facing Infra-Red sensors
(left and right) with a central Ultrasonic sensor (as
illustrated in Figure 5). Two connection topologies were
used as shown: crossed (Braitenberg One) and parallel
(Braitenberg Two) but with the connection modulated by
the signal from the central Ultrasonic sensor.
This arrangement plus the use of inverse and
proportional function on the signal connectors gives rise
to four behaviours (plus stationary or rest):
– B-MTAC MoveToAndCollide Cross
connection, Proportion function
– B-MTAS MoveTowardsAndStop Parallel
connection, Inverse function
– B-MAAS MoveAwayAndSlow Parallel
connection, Proportion function
– B-MAAO MoveAwayAndOscillate Cross
connection, Inverse function
At the level above the Braintenberg behaviours, a
four state Finite State Automata is used to determine
which of the behaviours is active. The principal drive
Figure 6: Communication across three levels of a swarm topology,
with a swarm consisting of five robots (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5; each in
one of four possible states). The second level (the VRi and VRj
agency) is the swarm organisation; the third level (the M1VRk
agency) is the learning framework for the swarm.
(or state) around which others are closely linked is
Curiosity; commonly defined as “a quality related to
inquisitive thinking such as exploration, investigation,
and learning” [67]. Here it is defined in terms of the
swarm and the individuals that comprise the swarm as
a cognitive state that makes an individual explore its
capabilities to address a given situation or problem (i.e.
an inquisitive approach to goal-directed behaviour). The
other three drive states areNormal; Rest; and LowMood (or
Frustration or Boredom). The robots switch from one state
to another based on their internal parameters and external
events. These events map onto three real valued metrics
which form the basis for state changes: Number of attacks;
Energy-level; Number of rest cycle.
In figure 6, the swarm of five robots (R1, R2, R3,
R4, R5) is shown connected via communication to a
first level meta-agency (for example VirtualRobot i or
VRi). Each of these robots is in one of the four possible
states (Curiosity, Rest etc.) described above. The swarm
organisation changes over time as the robots and the
macro-swarm (first level) agency modify their states.
In the figure just two of the possible swarm topology
organisations are shown (VRi and VRj). The third level
shows one meta-level macro-swarm agency (M1VRk); the
learning agency for the swarm. Other meta-level agencies
are possible; see [31] or [68] for further reading. Any
message passing between any two levels is time stamped;
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the accumulation of these messages becomes part of the
swarm’s history (or memory).
Messages between the robots and the first-level swarm
organisation (VRi) are defined as:
Mi,r,t:- <Bi,r,t, Sa,r,t>,
where Mi,r,t is message Mi from robot r at time-stamp t
defined over behaviour valence Bi (with Bi defined within
the interval R[0.0,1.0]) of robot r at time-stamp t with the
robot in one of four states as defined by state Sa of robot r
at time-stamp t.
The specifically chosen number of robots within the
swarm allows the swarm topology organisation (VRi) to
determine a mode state for the swarm (Sa,t); plus an
average Behaviour valency (Bi,t). These together with the
reported environmental state Envt are then compared to
a “goal-swarm history” profile to determine corrections to
the robots; i.e. the message from the swarm organisation
to each robot as Mi,r,t+1:- <Bi,r,t+1, Sa,r,t+1>. The meta-
level learning agencyuses the “goal-swarmhistory” to find
optimal behavioural changes for the swarm as a whole
and each individual within the swarm in order to further
the goals of the swarm. This work is ongoing but initial
designs and implementations have shown interesting
results. With the return of this paper’s co-author to her
native country, there is now the opportunity to investigate
this approach further using different robot types as well as
the development of the original swarm as part of the larger
CAMAL project (and then form the vertical coupling to the
right in Figure 3). This research becomes part of the larger
investigation into the veracity, validity and verification
of perceptual data as it affects a distributed model of
cognition which supports multi-modal BDI models.
7 Sonar Mapping of an
environment and its objects
One of the development testbeds used in moving from
a bespoke simulation to physical robot control is the
MobileSim testbed [60]. This simulation allows control
and communication of selected robots in a simple
environment (such as shown to the left in Figure 7)
or more complex maps to be loaded which reflect the
intended robot environment. Control of one or more of
the robots in the environment is via Aria [60] calls to
the robot microcontroller. In the current work a suite
of parameterised behaviours (written in C++) were used
within theAria framework (at thedesign level, theReactive
Behaviour Suite referred to in Figure 3) and reflect the
behaviours Ri, Rj etc. referred to in the lower part of
Figure 7: Sonar map from use of SCARAB control of Pioneer 3-
DX in mobilesim. Colour coded arcs represent a mapping from
objects located to their position in the simulator. The sonar map is
rotated as it reflects the orientation of the robot at the start of the
simulation run.
Figure 1. A listening cycle within the Aria software awaits
communication from higher level control architecture
(written in swi-prolog) and selects the appropriately
parameterised behaviour (as given in the callingmessage).
Once the reactive behaviour has completed (or failed) a
returning message is sent. Communication between these
software packages can be via cable or wireless network. A
full implementation of this has been tested with a suite
of robots but for simplicity a task using the simulation
software is described here.
The left image in Figure 7 shows a simple uncluttered
worldwith one object, four AmigoBots (yellow, blue, black
and green) and the principal controlled robot, a Pioneer
3-DX [69], at the start of the run. Over 15 BDI cycles the
Pioneer 3-DX has identified, approached and mapped the
convex hull of the object, three of the other robots and one
of the opaque walls (seen as green squares in the right
image of Figure 7 – the yellow squares represent objects
as yet not mapped). The ultrasonic beams, from one time
stamp, aremarked in the left image; the right image shows
theultrasonicmappingof all sonar readings takenover the
short 15 BDI cycle run (the simulation has run for 1000’s of
BDI cycles; the physical robots for several hundred).
The SCARAB generated right image (the fifth one
generatedby the robot over the 15 cycles) clearly showsfive
main loci for the ultrasonic beams. The starting position
is the central lower position. The other four loci relate to
the approach and sonar mapping of each of the objects
identified and mapped. The green AmigoBot has been
located and the empty space surrounded by longer arcs
to the lower left in the right image reflects its position.
However as the controlled robot has yet to approach and
model its convex hull it is not labelled in the image.
The task model used in this experiment is a variation
on that given in Figure 2; except instead of just tracking
Brought to you by | University of Hull
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/12/17 10:33 AM
Reasoning with BDI Robots | 53
any other robot, the controlled robot is tasked with
exploring the boundaries of its environment, locating
objects, identifying them and if possible mapping their
complete convex hull using sonar. The human user is
required to confirm the identity of the found objects as
one from a set of known objects (or as something new)
as no machine vision is used in the simulator. High level
norms provide the criteria for selecting which object to
investigate; those being nearest, then new, then unknown
aspects of a possibly known object. On approaching an
object the controlled robot determines the extremities of
that object and positions itself parallel to a straight arc
half way between the found extremities. It then moves
clockwise or anti-clockwise keeping itself approximately
the same distance away from the object as given by one
of the side ultrasonic sensors. If the object moves or
the pathway to continue mapping is blocked the robot
completes this mapping task at that point. Otherwise
the controlled robot navigates completely around the
object being inspected to give a full ultrasonic convex
hull of the object. These behaviours are managed by
the BDI control layer (in a tightly bound cycle) with
the ARIA level behaviours returning pose and ultrasonic
readings to the BDI layer. If a sequence of behaviours fail,
the meta-level architecture is activated to parameterise
the BDI so alternative BDI sequences are followed (as
explained in section 4.1). In a full CAMALarchitecturewith
multiple controlled robots the robot-centric sonar maps of
individual robots are relayed to the abstract agency (top of
Figure 1) for it to reason about and so provide an absolute
sonar map that can be shared across the robot colony.
The top-level agency must reason about how to resolve
differences across individual and combined ultrasonic
maps. How it does that is ongoing research but analogous
to previous work on landmark identification in medical
images [70].
8 Current Limitations
In moving from our own simulations to MobileSim to real
robots a number of issues have arisen. Many of these
will be well-known to robot practitioners such as noisy
data from sensors, the need for robust and fast vision
processing, the issues surrounding pose and localisation;
robot parts failing, limited battery life etc. Some of these
are being currently addressed; other issues require that
the architecture be rethought in terms of the deliberative-
reactive-motor mapping associated with any specific BDI
arc. While the research project, in its broadest sense,
attempts to remain true to the original aim of developing
a (now distributed) model of cognition that will generalise
across tasks, robot platforms and environments, specific
sub-projects, and investigations, sometimes we sacrifice
generality for efficiency and timeliness of implementation.
On completion, the sub-project is thenmapped back to the
over-arching project to allow generality at the expense of
efficiency. AsWei and Hindriks [71] found this can be time-
consuming and ultimately needs to incorporate learning
mechanisms. Their major stated obstacle would appear
to be the veracity of information arising from perceptual
(vision) systems. This issue is one that, as described earlier,
has no easy solution if the architecture is to work well in a
multitude of scenarios.
Visual perception in simulation work can be
shallow, in fact in many cases non-existent. However
for physical robots, it is a useful source of perceptual
information, and when working efficiently a relatively
reliable means of locating and identifying objects. In
earlier implementations [15], a reduced colour-coded
environment was used for an investigation in symbol
anchoring based on visual information. That research
was limited to the control of a single robot and three
objects of interest (blue ball, black robot and red robot).
The (omni-directional) vision system used there is at best
incomplete, at worst inadequate, for the current work.
Initial investigations into the use of 2.5D images (using
Kinects) proved troublesome. Only the larger Pioneer 3-
DX robot (plus some other teaching robots not used in
this research) had the computational power to use the
Kinect. The smaller AmigoBots could carry the Kinect
but the Raspberry Pis used on these robots proved
computationally inadequate. The smaller ActivityBots
could not carry such a camera and lacked the processing
capability to run the devices. For the smaller robots
carrying a Raspberry Pi, a Pi camera was installed.
For the Pioneer 3-DX and AmigoBots relatively cheap
webcams (as seen in Figure 4) were installed. As the initial
work required only that the suite of robots be identified
and other objects were to be classed as unknown (but
still mapped using sonar), a variety of algorithms from
OpenCV were used for blob matching using HSV and RGB
profiles acquired from trials with one robot sensing the
other robots in a variety of situations and illumination
levels. The principal investigator has sufficient experience
in machine vision to develop these algorithms but
unfortunately time constraints meant that many of the
problems associated with developing existing (or new)
algorithms for this application remain unsolved.
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the current state of
development of the vision system. Both figures were
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Figure 8: The left image is binary version arising from HSV and RGB
segmentation of the original. The right image is original with blobs
selected from binary segmentation overlaid. In this instance there
is relative good identification of the main object of interest (the red
AmigoBot)
Figure 9: The left image is binary version arising from HSV and RGB
segmentation of the original. The right image is original with blobs
selected from binary overlaid. In this instance there is relative poor
identification of the main object of interest (the red AmigoBot with
the omnidirectional camera)
taken with the same camera under identical illumination
levels. Figure 8 shows a red AmigoBot with minimal
surface infrastructure. In this instance there is relative
good identification of the main object of interest (the
red AmigoBot). Figure 9 shows a red AmigoBot with
more significant surface infrastructure supporting an
omnidirectional vision system. In this instance there is
relative poor identification of the main object of interest
(the red AmigoBot with the omnidirectional camera). Due
to time constraints a decision was taken to pursue the
sonar mapping described above as spatial reasoning is
deemed more important for the robot colony than object
identification via visual means. Spatial reasoning over
sonar images, and the correlation of robot location and
found objects from the individual maps (as described
above) was deemed to be of greater interest. The research,
for the time being, sidesteps this issue by using other
means to identify robots, such as colour coded LEDs or
Wi-Fi tags. Alternatively, we can ’cheat’ on this issue if
required by labelling the robots so the robot lab ambient
vision system in the recently installed laboratory can
identify the robots. Meanwhile a further sub-project [72]
is approaching the vision system by taking the ideas
from earlier work on anchoring and applying them to
robot colonies. The, as yet unresolved, visual perception
problems will be addressed when the full robot colony
architecture has progressed sufficiently with mechanisms
for exacting the veracity and validation of perceptual data
and beliefs.
There are a number of other failings in the current
architecture, beyond those listed above. For example,
experimental studies that explore the effect of different
task models across a controlled set of environments, the
effect of varying how intentions are modelled, and the
lack of any structural learning mechanisms. A number of
these shortcomings will be addressed when a new robotic
laboratory (as seen in figure 4) comes on-line.
9 Conclusions
The principal message that the movement of this research
into cognitive agencies frombespoke to generally available
simulations to physical robots is that it is (unexpectedly,
sic) troublesome and time consuming. What is relatively
trivial in simulation work, such as how to assess the
quality of sensor data in perceptual processes, becomes
a major sub-project in its own right. It is also tempting at
times to sacrifice generality of process and knowledge for
engineering expediency. This may not be an issue within
any one sub-project, but the mapping of the results back
to the parent project, and regain the generality of process
and knowledge, is not a task undertaken lightly, as many
of the references cited throughout the paper also state.
It is unclear how far closer the field of cognitive (and
behavioural) robotics is to the goal of a generalised robotic
intelligence as envisaged ten years ago by Levesque and
Lakemeyer [1] and reviewed by Duch et al. [73]. As
noted by Al-Razgan et al. [13] in their systematic review
of robotics, the field of robotics research has become
fragmented. The same can be said of the wider domain
of cognitive architectures as noted in the recent survey
of the research field [74]. Funding models for research
in the domain require that specific engineering solutions
to problems be found. If the focus is on assisted living,
for example Beetz et al. [75], or the use of cognitive
robots in industrial settings, for example Pedersen et
al. [12], then the research output reflects the engineering of
solutions appropriate to that funding stream. Alternatively
it may seem that some particular topic, for example the
computational modelling of emotion [76] as described
earlier and reviewed in Robinson and El Kaliouby [77],
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finds favour. This is to be expected but it is at the expense
of more challenging research directions such as the use
of imagery in reasoning [78] or the establishment of truly
generic tests of robot ability and generality.
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